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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\\rll,FUED 'VHEATL\", 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TEA ~I STERS L 0 C A L UNION 
~~~. affiliated with I N T E RNA- Case No. 
TIOX AL BROTHERHOOD OF 9908 
TE1\~IS'TERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
\\' AREHOUSEMEN and HELP-
ERS OF AMERICA, and WIL-
LL\~1 II. F.ACKRELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ST A TEl\IENT 
Plaintiff employed as a truck driYer by Union Pacific 
:\lotor Freight Company was discharged following three 
warning notice~ because of several successive Yiolations 
of company rule~. Three weeks later at the instance of 
the plaintiff the defendant Fackrell, agent of the de-
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fendent union, succeeded in persuading the company t<J 
rehire the plaintiff to his former employment. Plaintiff 
refused to accept such offer on the part of the company 
unless the company paid him for fifteen ,shifts he had lost 
while waiting for Fackrell to negotiate a rehiring of 
plaintiff by the company. The company refused to pay 
the plaintiff for such waiting time loss; thereupon plain-
tiff reque,sted the defendant union to process his alleged 
grievance pursuant to the collective bargaining agree-
ment between the company and the defendant union. 
Thereafter the f.our steps were taken pu:tsuant to such 
oontract arbitration 1nachinery and at each step the com-
pany refused to pay plaintiff any waiting time compen-
sation. 
During the hearing in the Newhouse Hotel pursuant 
to ~step four the Board of Arbitration consisting of six 
members and a secretary heard testimony from both 
·side's of the ·controversy including plaintiff's personal 
te~Stimony. Following such hearing the board decided that 
the company discharged plaintiff for good cause; that is 
to say, the hoard sustained the position of the company. 
Thereafter plaintiff brought the instant action to recover 
damages from defendants upon the ground that the de-
fendant Fackrell failed to supply sufficient evidence to 
.support the defense o.f plaintiff made by Fackrell at the 
~ ewhouse Hotel hearing and that plaintiff wais discrim-
inatorily discharged by the company. 
Briefly, the defendants' position is that the company 
retained it~ usual right and auth'ority to fire an employee 
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for good eaww, no cause, dis<'riminately or otherwise, 
insofar as a juri·sdiction of the state court and issues 
here prrsen ted are <.·oncerned. 
Plaintiff alleges in h1s complaint that his "discharge 
wa:-; without cause and was discriminatory.'' Plaintiff 
l'n•ply admitted his discharge was for good cause, the sole 
rl'tnaining ground would be discrimination; assuming 
that to he so, the jurisdiction of the state court would be 
plainly superseded by that of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. 
The term · 'discri1nination'' in the area of industrial 
labor relations has a special, general and well-known 
meaning. It involves always an intent on the part of the 
employer to distinguish in the treatment of an eiDJPloyee 
on the basis of labor union activity or affiliation. When 
an employer resorts to discrimination among his em-
ployees in the convenHonal industrial economic sense he 
thereby encourages or discourage,s member.ship in a 
labor organization - a subject matter we are not con-
cerned ";th here. The plaintiff takes the firm position 
that he was discrhninatorily discharged; hence that the 
~· discharge was legal and Yalid is admitted, unless plain-
~ tiff refers to discrimination in the federal statutory area 
~ in which even the state court would lack juri.sdiction. 
!1 An etnployer usually needs no rea~son to fire an employee. 
The employer always retains his basic right ·to fire an 
employee unlPi'S he contracts to do otherwise, and in this 
il 
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made no such agreement. The fact is, the contrary ap-
pears. 
Therefore the plaintiff having aiPparently predicated 
his recovery exclusively upon the sole ground of dis-
criminatory discharge, there remains n~o means by which 
the company could be legally forced against its will tore-
hire plaintiff or cou1pensate hin1 for \Vaiting time while 
defendant Fackrell was subsequently negotiating a rehire 
of plaintiff. Whether the defendants expended much or 
little skill and diligence in processing plaintiff's alleged 
grievance pursuant to the contractual arbitration agree-
ment is of no ·moment and ·beside the point. Such arbitra-
Hon procedure activity on the part of the defendant was 
an endeavor i:Q the nature of a collateral service, a bonus 
or serendipity exercised because of plaintiff's member-
ship card. 
TE1STIMONY OF PLAINTIFF 
\Vilfred Wheatly, the plaintiff, testified that he was 
fired by the Union Pacific Motor Freight Company on 
l\1:ay 27, 1960; (T 9-10) that defendant, Fackrell, found 
a heavy-duty driver job for Wheatly with Carbon Motor 
\Vays, but Wheatly refused to take the job (T 15-16-17); 
that he received a notice fron1 Union Pacific Motor 
Freight Company, his employer, to report back to work 
on .Tune 14, 1960, that he refused to return to work 
(T-19); that step 3, pursuant to the arbitration machin· 
pry set forth in the collective bargaining agreement be· 
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~ 
tween the defendant union and Union Pacific Motor 
~,reight \Y ays was held in the Teamsters' Building July 
1 ;), 1H60 ( T ~4) ; that step -l-, pursuant to the arbitrati~on 
proredure, about ~(i people present, was held at the New-
housl' Hotel ~Pptember 20, 1960, (T 25); that he testified 
in his own behalf (T 29); that the Board of Arbitrators 
sustained the company's discharge of Wheatly (T 30). 
\Yheatly admitted he had received three warning letters 
from the company before he was fired; (T 35) that two 
'rarning letters are sufficient for discharge under the col-
lt>din• bargaining agreement (T 35); that the defendant, 
Farkrell, was successful in restoring him to his job three 
weeks after he was discharged (T 36-37); that after de-
fendant Farkrell had gotten him restored to his former 
jllh with full rights, he refused to return to the job be-
('ausr the company did not pay him for 15 ·shifts he had 
lost while not working (T 38-39); that he was fired for-
merly from both Pacific Intermountain Express Company 
and Orange Transportation Company for failure to re-
port to work (T 57), similar reasons for which he was 
fired from Union Pacific :\Iotor Freight Company (T 63). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
~~ ADMITTED FACTS SHOW PLAINTIFF WAS DIS-
CHARGED FOR GOOD CAUSE. 
!l 
If it i:' a~sumed that the plaintiff was discharged by 
tlw rompany for good cause, any alleged damage for loss 
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of time or discrimination on the part of the company or 
careles·sness on the part of the defendants in failing to 
persuade the company to reinstate plaintiff to his fonner 
status without penalty or loss of time, would become ir-
revelant and rnoot. 
After the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, the 
court dismissed the cause. The facts edveloped at that 
time seem neither c01nplex nor prolix. Defendants' posi-
tion was then that the vlaintiff having quite freely ad-
mitted that he was discharged by the Union Pacific Motor 
Freight Company, his employer, for g·ood cause, defeated 
his action. Plaintiff also admitted that the defendants 
succeeded in getting his job re,stored to him after a short 
lay-off; also, admitted that he refused to take the job 
back unless he got paid about $375.00 for loss of time 
during which plaintiff was off duty while the defendants 
were eng~ged in persuading the company to hire him back 
on the job; also admitted that the Board of Arbitrators 
that heard the case, including plaintiff's testimony, had 
found that the company for good cause had discharged 
the 'Plaintiff. In such situation, defendants' positi1on was 
that plaintiff was obviously not entitled to $37'5.00 or any, 
other amount ·while waiting for the defendants to per-
suade the company to put plaintiff hack on his job, be· 
cause and by reason of the manifest facts that the com-
pany had good reasons for the discharge. 
The precipitate of ,plaintiff's position is set forth in 
the following quote from his testimony: 
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''Q. Now, a~ a result of your being discharged, 
you hadn't worked for the company, performed 
no services whatsoever for a period of fifteen 
working days. Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
(~. You had performed no services 1 
A. No services. 
Q. So you had the option to come back to take 
your job, but you refused 1Jo becaus-e you 
rt wanted the company to pay you for those fif-
~1 teen days you did not work? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. ~ow, you could have gone back to work, and 
that is all the damage you would have sus-
tained was tJo be out fifteen days' work. Is that 
rightt 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, why didn't you go back to work? Why 
did you ignore the company's order to come 
back to work after Fackrell got you back on 
the jobt 
A. Because there was discrimination there. I 
don't feel that I should have taken a greater 
penalty than somebody else just because he is 
the blood of Mr. Fackrell. 
Q. Are you talking about Fackrell or Norm Fack-
rell! 
A. That's right.t 
Q. Norm Fackrell was a helper, wasn't he~ 
A. 1 es, After he lost his driver's license, they 
had to make him a helper. 
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Q. Wait a minute. Norm Fackrell was helper. You 
were a driver. 
A. He was hired as a driver. 
Q. Wait a minute. N1orm Fackrell was working as 
a helper' 
A. Ye:s. 
Q. And you were working as a driver? 
A. A:bsolutely. 
Q. Y·our job is much - requires much more 
prollllPtness and dispatch than helper ',s does, 
doesn't itT 
A. That's right. 
Q. And you had two more warning notice·s, active 
warning notices, than Fackrell, Norm Fackrell, 
didn't you? 
A. I don't know just exactly how many warning 
notices Norm Fackrell got while he was down 
there. Very f.ew, I imagine. 
Q. Well, you were both fired at the same timeY 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. And your chief reason that you didn't come 
back to work is because they didn't pay you 
for the fifteen days you didn't work, and you 
support that and justify your conduct there 
because N onn Fackrell-
A. It wasn't the pay. It was the principle of the 
thing. 
Q. All right. It wasn't the pay. It was the princi-
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A. Yes, but he wasn't going to. 
Q. But he did go, didn't heY 
A. He had to or else go to jail. 
Q. N orn1 Fackrell got a wire to come back to 
work, didn't he ' 
A. Whether he got a wire or what the communi-
cation was I do not know. 
Q. \V ell, you knew of your own knowledge that he 
did go back to work after you were both fired 1 
A. Yes, and I know of my own knowledge he was 
two hours late the first day he went back to 
work. 
Q. "\Veil, Mr. Wheatley, I don't want to prolong 
this examination unduly. If you will just an-
swer the questions that I ask you, it would save 
me from cutting in with an objection, please. 
The fact of the matter is you knew Fackrell 
went back to w<>rk, and he had been docked ten 
working days, the time he wasn't working. You 
know that of your own knowledge1 
A. I know he went back to work. 
Q. Yes, and you know you didn't go back to work 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And )TlOU didn't g<> back to work because Norm 
went hack to work. Is that right 1 
A. And he received a vacation pay for going back 
to work. 
Q. He what! 
A. He received pay for the two week's he was off. 
11 
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He didn't get penalized in effect at all. They 
called it his vacation and paid him. 
Q. You mean-
A. He suffered no ·penalty. He got two weeks off 
as a guise and then received pay as a vaca-
tion, which was a rule of his. Wherever he 
went, to jail,or wherever it was, he took a vaca-
tion or leave of absence. 
Q. Well, I don't know about that. The contract, 
of course, provide's for vacation, as you well 
know, and you got paid for all your vacation 
that you took off too, didn't you~ 
A. I have a~sked to work my vacations, but the 
company wouldn't allow me to work my vaca-
tion. 
Q. Well, now, wait a minute. You had vacations 
while you were on that joh~ 
A. Yes, I did, sir. 
Q. And you got paid for those vacations~ 
A. Yes, I did.'' (T 39-42) 
At this time, the defendants were not contending 
plaintiff's complaint did not state a cause of ootion as 
plaintiff imp1ies in his hrief or that plaintiff was suing 
his own agent and mayhap not in an tenable position. 
The defendants took the position that plaintiff's dis-
charge being admittedly for good cause; plaintiff was 
therefore barred from the recovery of damages for loss 
of tin1e, imposition of penalty or otherwise. 
Shortly ater the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony, 
the court ruled as follows : 
12 
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''THE COURT: no, I don't have a position on 
it. I think the contract is clear here that they may-
company may discharge or suspend an employee 
for just cause, but it doesn't mean they have to, 
and if they don't want to on a fellow that's not 
quite SQ litigious and who gets in so many argu-
ment's with them, they well might forgive him, and 
somebody else who would be more litigious and 
more intractable might cause them not to give him 
the benefits of this ''may'' provision. 
In fact, I am ready to rule. There i~sn 't any 
question hut what this fellow wa~s fired for just 
cause. The fact that Norm- and Norm was fired 
for just cause too, but they put him back. They 
put this fellow 'back, but he wouldn't take it. H~is 
fuss was over $375, and there is a provision in this 
contract as to what to do about getting the money. 
He had his job. This. fellow was fired. He ought to 
have taken his job back and engaged in the fus1s 
over getting his money, and there isn't any need 
of letting him run a seven or eight thousand dollar 
bill up on us when all he had was $375 involved in 
the fil'St place. 
The defendants may have judgment for no 
cause of action, and the case is dismissed, and the 
jury is discharged, and I thank you for your 
services. 
We will recess until ten o'clock tomorrow 
morning." (T 68) 
1!¢ It is familiar doctrine that employers haYe a ri.g-ht to 
~~· make rules controlling conduct of its employees and to 
discharge or otherwise discipline employees who violate 
,,., those rul~~. For example, the employer can make no 
~··· smoking rules, rules requiring reports on absences and 
13 
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accidents and rules prohibiting collections without per 
mission and so on. The employer can even make rule1 
restricting solicitation of union membership on companJ 
property. The National Labor Relations Act does nol 
interfere in any way with an employer's usual operatior 
of his business, neither n1ay a labor union. All the Taft. 
Hartley Act does is to forbid the employer from thwart-
ing his employees' right to engage in or refrain from 
engaging in uni1on activities. It does not prevent him 
from discharging or disciplining his workerrS for cause 
or for no cause. The Aet merely prevents such action if 
the reason for the diseharge is anti-union or pro-union, 
and a fortiorari, the Act emphatically prohibits the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board from reinstating or award-
ing back pay to employees who were fired for cause; see 
Sec. lO(c). 
This is not a case where the company breached its 
collective bargaining contract or violated some state law 
or fired plaintiff because of hi~s union activities and the 
defendants at plaintiff's timely request neglected to 
process plaintiff's grievance pursuant to the bargaining 
eontract, just the opposite appears here. In this area, 
the authorities are legion, but we find no case authorities 
and ·we think none can be found supporting the concep-
tual pattern of plaintiff, that notwithstanding he was 
fired hecause of three or four successive violations of 
uompany rules and three or four company warning no-
tjces and thereafter the union succeeded in ~securing his 
job back which he deliberately refused to accept, then 
14 
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~ tlll' plaintiff in such situation may recover damages be-
~· (~ause he lost his job and was re-hired shortly thereafter 
1tt E.t the instance of defendant Fackrell. 
~ Plaintiff entirely overlooks the fundamental and 
: hasic element here involved that the company had the im-
plieit right to fire plaintiff for cause or for no cause and 
m.~ was under absolutely no obligation to take plaintiff back 
l!ll (which it did at the instance of defendant) under any 
'!llt • • • thi d H h 
, mrcumstance·s appeanng· 1n s recor . ence, ow 
.t~t: plaintiff expected the company to 1present him a premium 




the eourt below could not understand why defendants 
ntr were not entitled to a judgntent of dismissal and neither 
·~~r: do defendants. 
:f ~!f 
ore~ APPELLANT'S CASE AUTHORITIES 
~.w Plaintiff cites the case of Marchitto v. Central Rail-
1ti1ll 
r toad Company of Netc Jersey, 88 A2d 851 (1925). This 
llit.t was an action on six counts against the union and the 
~~w: h . f h G . . . 
· e rurman o t e r1evance ComiDittee. Among such 
b:.. counts was lost seniority, lost wages and a count stating 
il!~- that it was the duty of the Grievance Committee Chair-
:.·- man to .prosecute the claims of union members against 
:·> the railroad company which said chairn1an failed to 
;.1 
,.. prosecute. 
1 ~ The holding of the court was that the action against 
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cause of action against the grievance chairman. Such 
holding is of no comfort to the instant plaintiff for the 
reason that plaintiff's complaint is not an issue. The de-
fendant has assumed for the purpose of this appeal that 
plaintiff's complaint does state a cause of action. Never-
theles,s, the plaintiff admits he was discharged for good 
cause, therefore the defendants here take the position 
that no cause of action against the defendants could exist. 
The plaintiff cites the case of Fetcher v. Colorado ct 
Wyo1ning Railway Company, 347 P2d 156 (1959). The 
court below in this rna tter dismis,sed the complaint and 
the court above reversed. The complaint stated that the 
plaintiff was discharged without cause and that the 
Brotherhood, Lodge and the individual defendants were 
guilty of fraud, breach of duty and collusion with the 
railroad c01npany to bring about plaintiff's discharge 
without any cause. 
In the instant case the pleadings are not an issue. 
Plaintiff: cites the case of Fray v. Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters, et al, 101 NW2d 782 (1960). The complaint~ 
this case alleged that plaintiff was unlawfully discharged. 
The appellant court held that the plaintiff should have an 
opportunity to amend his complaint, hence, reversed the 
court belo·w which had dis1nissed the complaint on the 
facts pleaded. 
The issues in the three cited cases above mentioned 
arose on the pleadings -- defendant for the purposes of 
16 
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the in:-~tant appPa.l are not attar king plaintiff's complaint; 
hence, the ubove cited cases are inapplicable. 
The case of Solo v. IA'tlscraft Optical Corporation, 
1HO ~.Y.H. :!d 388 (1958) is cited. This case arose out of 
processing an arbitration, where fraud, collusion and 
misrepresentation were pleaded respecting such arbitra-
l . 
1 
tion proceeding; furthennore, the employees were denied 
' their right to individual counsel. Two labor unions, the 
~ t'mployer and a grorup of employee'S were involved. rrhe 
i nrbitration award was predicated principally on the 
~ ~round that the employees were denied the right to coun-
·: sel of their own choosing. 
Plaintiff in the case at bar never did seek an appeal 
~: lll' rehearing· of the arbitration award and never sought 
r. counsel other than Fackrell until after the Board of Arbi-
~ tration has sustained the ernployer in a decision holding 
that the discharg·e of plaintiff by the employer was valid, 
legal and justifiied. There was no fraud or collusion be-
n: 
tween the company and the defendants alleged in Wheat-
.S ley·~ complaint; but as:suming that such were alleged, 
; such allegations in vVheatle~'s complaint were not the 
~~ i~sue. It is the absolute failure of proof to support the 
allegations of complaint which is the issue here· to the 
' ' 
~~~ contrary the proof nullified the allegations of plaintiff's 
:P eomplaint and none other than \Yheatley supplied such 
proof personally. 
, ".,.herefore to the single point raised by plaintiff, to 
~wit: ·_'that plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action 
17 
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against defendants and the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in dismissing said complaint.'' 
The defendants respond that the pleadings are not 
an issue in this ca.se for the reason that the defendants 
do not presently deny the complaint states a cause of 
action. But an indispensable requisite to the plaintiff's 
case is that the proof must disclnse an invalid discharge 
of plaintiff by the company. Thus the issue of vital rela-
tive consequence is that the plaintiff's own proof and 
repeated admissrions disclnse that plaintiff WBJS dis-
charged for cause and good cause which admissions sup-
ply abundant proof that the company was justified in the 
exercise of its managerial right to discharge plaintiff 
and as a result of ·Such valid exercise of management 
prerogative no damage to plaintiff cnuld possibly lie 
against his employer which is not here sued or the de-
fendants who engaged in an extra gratuity bonus en-
deavor in negotiating with the company successfully to 
the end that plaintiff was later rehired for a similar em-
ployment to that fron1 which plaintiff was discharged. 
Defendants therefore submit that the court below 
·was fully justified in dismissing plaintiff',s cause of ac-
tion and its decision should be sustained. 
All of which is respectfully submitted. 
ELIAS HANSEN 
CLARENCE M. BECK 
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